ABSTRACT The ability to produce an H5N1 influenza virus that can be transmitted from human to human raises both biosecurity and biosafety concerns. After analyzing the biosafety risks of such a virus, we propose that it be handled at biosafety level 4 (BSL4) containment until and unless it becomes clear that the risks to humans and other mammals can be mitigated.
tion, Confirmed human cases of H5N1 2003-2012; http://www .who.int/influenza/human_animal_interface/H5N1_cumulative _table_archives/en/index.html). While there has been debate regarding the true number of infected humans, it is evident that the CFR is certainly above that of the 1918 strain, something about which most experts agree (6) . Until additional data are collected, we must assume that a large percentage of infected individuals will not survive H5N1 infection. The third question deals with transmission. This new influenza virus is spread through a respiratory route and, therefore, will be present in aerosols created in the laboratory. The BMBL makes special note of agents that can be transmitted by the aerosol route, categorizing them as "serious laboratory hazard [s] ." Some scientists have suggested that transmission between ferrets does not necessarily translate into human transmissibility (7) . While acknowledging that the ferret is indeed an experimental model, we must assume that it is a valid model and therefore that this virus would spread similarly to other pandemic human strains in history. Finally, there is the issue of treatment and prevention. To date, a vaccine against H5N1 influenza virus has not been available, ruling out immunization of laboratory workers or the general public. While the virus does respond to commonly used antivirals, it is reasonable to assume, based on experience with the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, that virus spread would outpace the capacity of the public health system. In addition, if there were an H5N1 pandemic, drug resistance would undoubtedly evolve.
Overall, then, we believe that the newly derived H5N1 HPAI virus should be handled at the highest biocontainment level, BSL4. This is largely based on a comparison to the natural H5N1 influenza virus. For example, the human-to-human transmissible form is, by definition, able to spread more readily. If a BSL3 worker were to be infected with natural H5N1 virus, the infection would likely stop in that individual. With human-to-human aerosol transmission, others could become infected. It has been argued that by the time the nonspecific symptoms of influenza have been confirmed to be bona fide influenza, it is too late for drugs to be effective (8) . Subsequent transmission could occur rapidly, outpacing the public health system's capability to contain it. Given the mortality rate, such a laboratory exposure event could lead to unacceptable numbers of deaths. Once outside the laboratory, there is also a threat to farm animals such as pigs. We also note that in addition to the enhanced biosafety procedures in a BSL4 facility, the agent would have more physical security.
These considerations and the assumptions used to analyze them have become more public over the past decade as high-level pathogen work has found its way into academic settings, outside the traditional boundaries of government laboratories. The environmental impact statements required for these projects, prepared by expert panels and made public to the surrounding communities, have raised the bar considerably for those who wish to have their safety assumptions and scenarios vetted in the public light. Although the matter at hand is not yet subject to those regimented assessments, it is not exempted from the same public scrutiny and the same need for high-level safety assurance.
Of course, one could argue that we may be wrong in our assumptions regarding the validity of the ferret model and that better serological studies may indicate that the CFR is more like that of seasonal influenza. In the meantime, why not follow the precautionary principle? We would draw an analogy to the early days of recombinant DNA work. It is almost hard to believe today that the cloning of the herpes simplex virus thymidine kinase gene in 1979 was carried out at BSL4 (or P4, as it was then known) containment (9). This experiment was originally judged to be high risk, but over time we came to understand that it is not: today, the same work would be performed at BSL1 containment (NIH guidelines, Section III-E-1). Perhaps an H5N1 vaccine will soon be available, making high-level containment no longer necessary. Until data are obtained to show that human-to-human transmissible H5N1 influenza is not as dangerous as it seems, however, we must be prudent. We owe it to the public worldwide to demonstrate that we are working with these viruses in a responsible manner.
